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EMPATHIC DIALOGUE:




In response to a recent call for heightened attention to judicial ethics and
quality judicial decision making, this Article posits the idea that judges
should engage in empathic dialogue, a judicial discipline, to achieve em-
pathic constitutionality-a set of value choices that attend to the real world
effects of their decisions on people. It seeks a paradigm shift from rights-
neutral formalism to rights-focused value principles in federal courts. And
it argues that especially during these economically challenging times,
judges should assess their biases to minimize "blind injustice," the unin-
tended negative effects of their decisions and to achieve true justice.
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I want to tell you a story. I'm going to ask you all to close your eyes
while I tell you the story. . . . This is a story about a little girl walking
home from the grocery store one sunny afternoon.... Two men jump
out and grab her. They drag her into a nearby field and they tie her up
and they rip her clothes from her body. Now they climb on. First one,
then the other, raping her, shattering everything innocent and pure
with a vicious thrust in a fog of drunken breath and sweat. And when
they're done, after they've killed her tiny womb, murdered any chance
for her to have children, to have life beyond her own, they decide to
use her for target practice. They start throwing full beer cans at her.
They throw them so hard that it tears the flesh all the way to her bones.
Then they urinate on her. Now comes the hanging. They have a rope.
They tie a noose. Imagine the noose going tight around her neck and
with a sudden blinding jerk she's pulled into the air and her feet and
legs go kicking. . . . It snaps and she falls back to the earth. So they
pick her up, throw her in the back of the truck and drive out to Foggy
Creek Bridge. Pitch her over the edge. And she drops some thirty feet
down to the creek bottom below. Can you see her? Her raped,
beaten, broken body soaked in their urine, soaked in their semen,
soaked in her blood, left to die. Can you see her? I want you to pic-
ture that little girl. Now imagine she's white.'
-Character Jake Tyler Brigance in A Time to Kill.
1. A TIME To KILL (Regency Enterprises 1996); see Memorial Quotes for A Time to
Kill, IMDE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0117913/quotes (last visited July 25, 2012) (Char-
acter Jake Tyler Brigance, played by Matthew McConaughey, talking about Tonya Hailey
in his summation before an all-white, southern jury, in the criminal trial of an African-
American, Vietnam war hero being prosecuted for killing the white druggies who raped,
hung, and left his young daughter for dead.). The story raises the question of whether
retribution is a defensive theory of justice examining two competing principles of justice
found in the two maxims: "an eye for an eye," compared to "two wrongs do not make a
right." See generally IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 28-41
(John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (noting that judicial punishment should be in response to
the crime committed ).
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I. INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL CHARACTER AND JUSTICE
A. FROM FORMALISM TO VALUE PRINCIPLES
rights-based approach to justice 2 must consider the role of judi-
cial character 3 in the federal courts. This Article critically ana-
lyzes the nature of a federal judge's judicial character in
response to a call for heightened judicial ethics in federal courts4
and to the judicial decision making debate.5 The thesis herein is
2. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY (1978) (arguing
against the legal positivism and economic utilitarianism theory of Anglo-American law,
asserting that individuals have legal rights beyond those explicitly laid down and political
and moral rights against the state and prior to the welfare of the majority); BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (discrediting legal formalism or law
as a closed system of rules, logically applied); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972).
3. Judicial character is defined, for the purpose of this Article, as the pattern of judi-
cial behavior, judicial personality or a judge's legal constitution composed of her decisions,
dicta, out of court pronouncement, judicial training, psyche, personal beliefs, and propensi-
ties. See generally Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does it Matter), 26 CONST. COM-
MENT. 97 (2009) (analyzing judicial character and what it demands of a judge from the
perspective of virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence and its relationship to constitutional
decision making). One notable judicial characteristic is humility-the realization that
one's judgment is always suspect to criticism and correction. The importance of judicial
character in legal decision making reflects the American legal realist school of thought as
to the indeterminacy of law, as reflected in Jerome Frank's observation that a judicial deci-
sion might reflect mundane influences such as what a judge ate for breakfast. See generally
JEROME FRANK, LAW & THE MODERN MIND (1930); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (critiquing popular theories on the legal basis of
decision making); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881) ("The life of
the law has not been logic; it has been experience.").
4. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883-85 (2009) (Justice
Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, analyzed the nature of judicial bias, and established
a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process test for it.); Bob Edgar, "Impartial" Supreme Court
Justices Raise Money for Opponents of Health Care Law, HUFFINGTONPOST (Nov. 14, 2011,
5:22 PM), http://huffingtonpost.com/rev-bob-edgar/impartial-supreme-court-j-b_1093468.
html; Adam Cohen, Judges Are for Sale-and Special Interests Are Buying, TiME (Oct. 31,
2011), http://ideas.time.com/2011/10/81/judges-are-for-sale-and-special-interests-are-buy-
ing; Tony Mauro, Law Profs Urge Ethics Rules for Supreme Court Justices, BLT: THE
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011, 1:31 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/02/
law-profs-urge-ethics-rules-for-supreme-court-justices.html (reporting that over 100 law
professors proposed congressional hearings and legislation for "mandatory and enforcea-
ble" ethics rules for Supreme Court justices for the first time, as currently required for
lower federal court judges).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 381 (1995) ("The internal per-
spective-putting oneself in the other person's shoes-that is achieved by the exercise of
empathetic[sic] imagination lacks normative significance."); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of
Judges in a Government of by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo
Lecture, 30 CARDOzo L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (asserting that the "three elements of a just
decision" are "facts, law, and empathy"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Op-Ed., Our Fill-in-the-Blank
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A27 ("[I1t should be apparent that conservative
judges do not disinterestedly call balls and strikes ... they make value judgments, often in
an aggressively activist manner that goes well beyond anything the framers themselves
envisioned."); Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Empathy, LIBERTARIAN, May 5, 2009, http://
forbes.com/2009/05/04/supreme-court-justice-opinions-columnists-epstein.html ("In look-
ing at a dispute between an injurer and an injured party, or between a creditor and debtor,
the judge ignores personal features of the litigant that bear no relationship to the merits of
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that federal courts should adopt a paradigm shift6 from formalism,7
a rights-lethal combination of Wechslerian neutralism8 and structural-
ism, 9 to rights-oriented value principles10 or empathic constitutional-
the case."); Ilya Somin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Is There a Conflict Between Empathy and
Good Judging?, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opi-
nionla/la-oew-chemerinsky-somin28-2009may28,0,4921073.story (Ilya Somin arguing that
empathy "is . .. a poor tool for judicial decision making;" Erwin Chemerinsky arguing that
in exercising discretion, judges, even conservative ones, "should be mindful of the conse-
quences of their decisions on people's lives").
6. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(3d ed. 1962) (on the nature of a "paradigm shift," noting that during revolutions in sci-
ence, the discovery of anomalies leads to a new paradigm that changes the rules of the
game and the "map" directing new research; asks new questions of old data; and moves
beyond the puzzle-solving of normal science).
7. Formalism refers hereinafter to a judicial style of decision making that is preoccu-
pied with rights-neutral results, combining rigid dedication to a dogmatic, super-analytical
processing of rules along with a concern for federal-state relationships with a general disre-
gard for precedent when it comes to promoting or enforcing individual and/or minority
rights. This definition is exemplified by Chief Justice John Roberts's "umpire allusion"
that, as a Supreme Court Justice, he merely calls balls and strikes. Roberts: "My job is to
call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat," CNN.com (Sept. 12, 2005, 4:58 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/index.html ("Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. . . . I will decide every case
based on the record, according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my
ability. And I will remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or
bat."). See generally Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, Note, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the
Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113 (2010) (for a thorough history of the
judge-as-umpire analogy).
8. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1959). See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10-11 (1971). In his
theory of distributive justice, Rawls stated that to be fair in selecting the principles of
justice, the possibility of bias must be removed. Id. Fairness in Rawls's theory requires the
more favored to agree to the type of distributive rule they would prefer if they were not
more favored. Id.
9. Structuralism referees hereinafter to a form of judicial philosophy in which the
states are provided leeway to decide individual and/or minority rights as long as those
rights are restricted or limited, but where states are restrained if and when they seek to
broaden individual or minority rights. Its elements include a preoccupation with formality/
structure, failure to consider fundamental rights, and ignoring the law's effects on average
citizen's everyday lives. See Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme Court's "New" Federalism:
An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 517, 519-20 (2000) [hereinafter Crusto,
New Federalism] (analyzing the Supreme Court's new federalism vision as an anti-rights'
agenda relative to individual and civil rights). See generally Noah Feldman, Imagining a
Liberal Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at MM38 [hereinafter Feldman, Imagining] (call-
ing for a "new progressive constitutional vision"); BRUCE ACKERMAN ET AL., THE CONSTI-
TuTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (essays on the future
direction of constitutional law); GOODWIN LIu ET AL., KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTI-
TUTION (2009) (presenting a compelling and common-sense approach to constitutional in-
terpretation); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE
CONSTITUTION (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has moved dramatically to the
right in response to a rigid Republican ideological agenda); and Gunther, supra note 2.
10. Value principles the best civil and human rights' principles that intersect, or are the
confluence or harmony between, liberal and conservative constitutional theories of justice.
Some might call this approach Pollyannaism, based on the assertion that there is no inter-
section between conservative and liberal values. This Article hopes to prove those critics
wrong. One example of a value principle is fairness: that the law should be fair in both its
creation and application. Value principles also recognize the existence of an "American
Constitution" as being the confluence of the U.S. Constitution, federal constitutional law,
state constitutional law, and other written (and sometimes unwritten) values, "so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Michael H.
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ity."1 Concerned with the real world effects of judicial decisions on peo-
ple, 1 2 this judicial character analysis is timely because federal courts con-
tinue to face significant civil and human rights issues including same-sex
marriage,13 immigration rights, 14 separation of church and state,15 and
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). One such shared,
centralizing body of positive principles is embodied in the enduring words of the Founding
Fathers in the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed ....
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Of course, because some
American values are negative, such as racism, sexism, and enslavement there is a critical
need for a proven dialectical process or central constitutional theory to promote the best of
our civil and human rights principles and to eradicate those negative traditions and prac-
tices. This Article seeks an intervention into the subconscious of American constitutional
theory to weed out corrupt principles of unfair bias and grow the seeds of inclusion and
American harmony. Cf Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV.
115, 115 (2007) (suggesting that "rather than attempt to cleanse the law of culturally parti-
san meanings . . . lawmakers should endeavor to infuse it with a surfeit of meanings capa-
ble of simultaneously affirming a wide range of competing worldviews").
11. Empathic constitutionality refers hereinafter to the state of judicial decision mak-
ing that harmonizes the current conflict in federal courts, and particularly Supreme Court
decision making, so as to minimize persistent political disagreement. See generally Guido
Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Alloca-
tion of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113-27 (explaining the four "schools" or
"movements" of law, including the formalist, functionalist, legal process, and law-and-sta-
tus approaches). This Article follows the Calabresian "Law and Status" school of law de-
scribed as that in which "legal scholars should examine how laws and the legal system
affect specific categories of people. . . . [T]he focus has been on groups that have been
viewed as exploited, disadvantaged, or otherwise dominated." Id. at 2127. Cf PHILIP Bon-
arrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (emphasizing the su-
perior role of tradition in the "modalities of constitutional argument;" i.e., structural,
textual, ethical, prudential, historical, and doctrinal); NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDER-
STANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-4 (2d ed. 1999) (describing seven different categories
of constitutional arguments, including "textual," the "intent of the Framers," "ongoing
practice," "judicial practice or precedent," "structural arguments (such as federalism),"
"consequential arguments," and "ethical arguments"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 541-45 (1999).
12. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The
Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515-22 (2004)
(explaining that equality analysis often results in the loss or reduction of rights generally).
Using the term "people" is not meant to preclude the importance of the environment or
other concerns.
13. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 995-1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding a state constitutional ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the U.S.
Constitution's Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses); Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387-97 (D. Mass. 2010) (ensuring federal benefits for same-sex
couples and holding that Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010) (inval-
idating sections of SB1070, wherein Arizona sought to identify and deport illegal immi-
grants), aff'd 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, & remanded 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 114-15 (9th Cir.
2010) (upholding the constitutionality of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance); id. at
1114-15 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (noting that the "atheist minority [has] ... to sustain
the religious preferences of the God-fearing majority ... illustrates the inevitable result of
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the death penalty. 16
B. JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
To achieve a paradigm shift in judicial decisions, this Article will focus
on judicial character, specifically by evaluating judicial temperament,' 7
including the unconscious biases that a judge brings to the decision mak-
ing process.' 8 Reflecting on the excerpt from A Time to Kill, judges who
focus on their umpire role may fail to consider how their unconscious
biases affect their decisions and the litigants themselves. As a result, they
seldom evaluate how their decisions broadly impact people. Such judicial
behavior as is referred to hereinafter "blind injustice".19 In particular,
defining injury in the absence of empathy"); id. at 1115 n.109 ("[Empathy] is a quality that
is most desirable in, even if frequently absent from, today's federal judges at all levels of
the judicial system").
16. See generally John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKs (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/dec/23/death-sen-
tence/?pagination=false (criticizing capital punishment as "the pointless and needless ex-
tinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public
purposes"); Adam Liptak, Ex-Justice Criticizes Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010,
at Al (Stevens "now believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional ... a system ... shot
through with racism, skewed toward conviction, infested with politics and tinged with hys-
teria."); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Death Penalty: The In-
creasing Danger of Executing the Innocent, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpen-
altyinfo.org/node/523 (last visited July 25, 2012) (describing the rights of death penalty
innocents).
17. Judicial temperament refers hereinafter to the conscious and unconscious, profes-
sional and personal bias, or philosophy a judge brings to her job of judging. Cf H. JEFFER-
SON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL
DECISION (1982) (contending that the Constitution requires judges to decide cases in good
faith, using the "constitutional virtues" of candor, intellectual honesty, humility about the
limits of constitutional adjudication, and willingness to admit that they do not have all the
answers). See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE
AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) (suggesting that constitutional adjudication
is merely politics in disguise and that judges are legislators in robes who rule according to
their political views); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008) (describing nine
theories of judicial behavior: the attitudinal, strategic, sociological, psychological, eco-
nomic, organizational, pragmatic, phenomenological, and legalist theories).
18. See generally John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial
Decision Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2010) (exploring
unconscious influences on judicial decision making and implicit bias); Diana Kapiszewski,
Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision making On Politically Crucial Cases, 45 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 471 (2011) (analyzing judicial decision making in potentially landmark cases
and suggesting that as justices in developed and developing democracies alike contemplate
the content of each politically important case and the context in which they are deciding it,
they balance six considerations: their own ideology, judicial institutional interests, elected
branch preferences, the possible economic or political consequences of their decision, pop-
ular opinion regarding the case, and the law and legal considerations); Paul M. Secunda,
Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2010) (analyzing the "cultural
cognition theory" in labor and employment law and concluding that a judge's cultural
background shapes the outcome of legal decisions). See also generally Charles R. Law-
rence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND
ITS STUDY 3 (1930) ("[W]hat these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law
itself.").
19. "Blind injustice" refers hereinafter to the unattended, unconscious judicial bias by
which judges fail to consider the real life effects of their legal decisions on people, often as
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when judges fail to address biases of class or20 the middle class,21 the
impoverished, 22 and the socially-disadvantaged, 23 many with unmet legal
representation needs. 24
To address blind injustice, this Article posits that judges, especially fed-
eral judges, adopt a traditional, yet often unused disciplining referred to
hereinafter as "empathic dialogue." 25 Using empathic dialogue, a judge
inquires beyond her professional and personal experiences before ruling,
a result of formalism; holding the interests of institutions over the interests of people; or
allowing the rule of law to prevail over fairness, morality, or justice.
20. Classism refers hereafter to the conscious or unconscious discrimination against a
person or a group of persons due to their socio-economic class, including the middle class,
the impoverished, and the socially disadvantaged. See Mitchell F. Crusto, Unconscious
Classism: Entity Equality for Sole Proprietors, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 222-24 (2009)
[hereinafter Crusto, Unconscious Classism] (defining "unconscious classism," as a combi-
nation of Critical Class Theory with recent theories of unconscious adverse behavior); see
also EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE. RACE, GEN-
DER, IDENTITY AND EcoNoMIcs (2005) (questioning why no legal language addresses class
in the United States and suggesting what such a language might look like, and using race
and gender injustice to interrogate both critical theory and economic theory); Mario L.
Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 109-12, 126-29 (2009) (exploring
the equal-protection analysis for constitutional protection of socioeconomic rights); Edgar
S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317,
1317-44 (1964) (discussing the constitutional basis of President Johnson's war on poverty);
Clark Freshman, Foreword: Revisioning the Constellations of Critical Race Theory, Law
and Economics, and Empirical Scholarship, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2267, 2267-68 (2003) (sug-
gesting an overlap between Critical Race Theory and empirical studies of inequality);
Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9, 40-45 (1969) (providing an early articulation of the moral and
political imperative for the recognition of constitutional welfare rights); Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739-46 (1964); Weinstein, supra note 5, at 25-26
(noting that with "sharp and growing socioeconomic differences," some litigants living
"lives of silent desperation" have a rightful claim to judges' attention, many of whom are
often "out of touch emotionally" with the litigants before them). Cf OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 283 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter OXFORD DICTIONARY] (defining "classism"
generally as "[t]he belief that people can be distinguished or characterized . . . on the basis
of their social class").
21. Middle class refers hereinafter to the class of business people, professionals, highly
skilled workers, well-to-do farmers, and other workers whose income is between the
wealthy and the impoverished.
22. Impoverished refers hereinafter to the class of people whose income is below that
of the middle class or is below the poverty line.
23. Socially disadvantaged refers hereinafter to the class of people who in addition to,
or in spite of, their income are subject to societal discriminatory treatment, including wo-
men, racial minorities, same-sex couples, children, immigrants, military service people, eld-
erly, students, and others due to religious affiliation.
24. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Comments, 73 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 927 (2004); Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91
(2002).
25. "Empathic dialogue" refers hereinafter to a judicial discipline by which a judge's
obligation to consciously makes inquiry beyond professionat, intellectual, or personal
worldviews, and unconscious biases (1) to consider the experiences of others and the law's
impact on the lives of everyday people; (2) to protect people from unfair outcomes and
injustices; and (3) to redress those injustices especially when they result from unjust bias to
achieve value principles of justice. Cf OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 184 (defin-
ing "empathy" as "[t]he power of projecting one's personality into (and so fully compre-
hending) the object of contemplation").
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takes into account the impact of the law on all people, and decides in a
manner that avoids doing harm. This is an especially valuable and essen-
tial tool in constitutional cases that often have the same broad impact as
legislation. Far from a panacea, empathic dialogue does not dictate who
wins in any case.26 It is a process promoting true justice.
An analysis of judicial temperament raises important questions about
justice: Does a judge's failure to address her subconscious biases affect
the quality of justice? Will a conscious intervention into a judge's sub-
conscious biases result in more just decisions? Finally, will judges volun-
tarily adopt and utilize certain tools to reach value principles? Answering
these questions help us address the neutrality crisis in judicial decision
making.27
This Article's analysis of judicial temperament benefits greatly from
recent scholarship relating to empathy and judicial decision making. Em-
pathy scholarship includes, but is not limited to, corporate social respon-
sibility,2 8 feminist principles of justice,29 judicial selection, 30 jurors,3 1 legal
26. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the
United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (2004) (observing
that there is no difference between conservative and liberal constitutionalism, that the di-
vide is over results, not methods, and that "conservatives are much more likely to pose
their decisions as the products of a neutral methodology and not as the products of value
choices").
27. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition,
and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1-30 (2011) (examining
how the study of motivated reasoning, such as "cultural cognition," explains the current
"neutrality crisis" in the Supreme Court's decision making).
28. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1461-80 (2002) (exploring
empathy's role in corporate governance, especially relative to workplace discrimination).
29. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574,
1575-79, 1628 (1987) (analyzing empathy as imagining and experiencing the situation of
another, challenging traditional legal discourse's equating logic with reason and under-
standing, and arguing that feeling and imagination also are important aspects of reason and
understanding); Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in
Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 931 (1994) (analyzing
empathic liberalism as confusing and misguided and arguing that "empathy cannot validly
be deployed either to attack liberal legalism or to construct its replacement").
30. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 1193 (1988); Orrin G.
Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y
1035, 1038-44 (2009) (noting the separation of powers in judicial selection, judicial re-
straint as a judicial qualification, and Senatorial deference to a President's qualified nomi-
nees); Linda C. McClain, Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, and Social Change: A
Comment on Lani Guinier's Demosprudence Through Dissent, 89 B.U. L. REV. 589,
601-02 (2009) (noting the inspiring role that both dissenting judges and the President play
in spurring ordinary people to engage in social and constitutional change).
31. See, e.g., Douglas 0. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887,
887-910 (1996) (exploring the role that race-related empathy plays in criminal justice).
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education social networking, 32 legal history,33 moral capitalism, 34 philo-
sophical principle,3 5 professionalism, 36 psychology of race and justice,37
scientific principle,38 storytelling,39 substantive principles of constitu-
tional law,40 the criminal justice system,41 the Sonia Sotomayor Supreme
32. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 993-94
(1992) (arguing that lawyers should employ empathy or "approval" to confirm their clients'
feelings); Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analy-
sis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIo ST. L.J. 457, 457-506 (2010) (analyzing data
collected on law clerks nationwide to argue that social influences, or "peer effects" on
judicial decision making are present in addition to political, strategic, and other factors).
See generally Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5
CLINICAL L. REV. 605 (1999); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 621 (2002).
33. See generally MARK ELLIOTT, COLOR-BLIND JUSTICE: ALBION TOURG8E AND THE
QUEST FOR RACIAL EQUALITY FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO Plessy v. Ferguson (2006); Kim
McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1633 (2010) (analyzing Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo's lectures on
judicial decision making to argue that the recognition of one's life experiences and senti-
ments of justice in the act of judging does not render one an "activist" judge).
34. See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Obama's Moral Capitalism: Resuscitating the Ameri-
can Dream, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2009) [hereinafter Crusto, Obama's Moral
Capitalism] (exploring empathy's relationship to moral capitalism in the context of preda-
tory lending). Cf ADAM MACLEOD, EMPATHY'S WHITE ELEPHANT: RESPONDING TO THE
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS WITHOUT DENIGRATING THE POOR 7-11 (2011) (arguing
that the law should provide a dignified means for the poor to address foreclosures due to
subprime lending).
35. See generally Empathy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/empathy/ (last visited July 25, 2012).
36. See, e.g., Note, Being Atticus Finch: The Professional Role of Empathy in To Kill a
Mockingbird, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1682-1702 (2004) (exploring empathy's role in
professionalism).
37. See, e.g., MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE 5-14 (2000) (exploring how, as a result of cognitive
processing, people empathize more with similar individuals); Pat K. Chew, Judges' Gender
and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions,
14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 359, 361-69 (2011) (discussing the influence of a judge's
gender in employment discrimination cases).
38. See, e.g., Natalie Angier, The Biology Behind the Milk of Human Kindness, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at Al (reporting that "a raft of new research in humans suggests that
oxytocin underlies the twin emotional pillars of civilized life, our capacity to feel empathy
and trust," citing a recent finding in The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences).
39. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Em-
pathy, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 68 n.25 (1996) (on the essential role of emotions in the law);
Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2099-2102 (1989) (critically assessing the polemical invo-
cation of a vague concept of empathy, and exploring its role in the deep dissatisfaction with
the abstract and collective focus of law and legal discourse).
40. See, e.g., Crusto, Obama's Moral Capitalism, supra note 34, at 1039; Teresa Bruce,
The Empathy Principle, 6 LAw & SEXUALITY 109, 109-124 (1996) (identifying the empathy
principle in existing legal theory and how it might apply to actual cases).
41. See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY IN LAw
AND PUNISHMENT (2006) (developing a concept of empathy with enough content to do real
analytical and normative work in the criminal justice arena).
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Court appointment,42 and tort liability. 43 While benefiting from this valu-
able scholarship, this Article enhances on it by focusing on the role of
judicial temperament in achieving value principles in federal courts.
C. OVERVIEW
This Article explores how unconscious judicial bias can negatively im-
pact people's lives and what judges can do to improve their judicial tem-
perament to achieve value principles. Part I introduces the need for a
paradigm shift from formalism to value principles of constitutional law,
suggests judicial temperament as the analytical lens to assess the shift,
and reiterates the Article's thesis. Part II argues that blind justice results
in injustice, requiring a change to address unconscious judicial tempera-
ment. Part III suggests empathic dialogue as a means to accomplish these
objectives. Part IV posits empathic dialogue as a valuable judicial disci-
pline. Part V responds to arguments against empathic dialogue as a judi-
cial tool. Lastly, Part VI concludes that empathic dialogue is a valuable
judicial discipline to achieve value principles.
II. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The answer is that new and pressing constitutional issues and problems
loom on the horizon-and they cannot be easily solved or resolved using
the now-familiar frameworks of liberty and equality. These problems
cluster around the current economic situation, which has revealed the ex-
traordinary power of capital markets and business corporations in shap-
ing the structure and actions of our government. . . . Progressive
constitutional thinkers, so skilled in arguing about social and civil rights,
are out of practice in addressing such structural economic questions....
A truly progressive constitutional project . . . demands that the Supreme
Court and other bodies acknowledge the government's responsibility to
protect our democracy from the harmful side effects of all-powerful
markets. 44
42. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263, 264-70 (2010) (exploring the role of experience and the relation-
ship between law and emotions); Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empathy,
and the Role of a Judge: The Senate Confirmation Hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40
U. BALT. L.F. 1, 16-18 (2009) (drawing on his own life experiences as well as those of
notable Supreme Court Justices and the Maryland appellate judges to propose that a
judge's life experience and the possession of empathy can actually make him or her a more
well-rounded jurist); Lauren Gilbert, The 26th Mile: Empathy and the Immigration Deci-
sions of Justice Sotomayor, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 1-11, 38-45 (2010) (analyzing
Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina" comments against her judicial philosophy during her
seventeen years on the bench and exploring empathy as a judicial virtue).
43. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality,
Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARO. L. REV.
1, 29-40 (1996) (exploring the dimensions of race and empathy in malpractice cases).
44. Feldman, Imagining, supra note 9. See generally NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS:
THE BATELES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR's GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, at xi, xiii (1st
ed. 2010) (chronicling the development of judicial liberalism).
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We are currently in the midst of a constitutional law crisis caused by
the failure of federal judges to recognize the impact that biases have on
their decisions. An analysis of recent Supreme Court cases and the re-
cent judicial decision making debate evidences a need for increased at-
tention to value principles. In a "post-supercapitalism" 45 economy,4 6 it is
unconscionable for federal judges to ignore the law's impact on people's
lives.
A. BLIND JUSTICE
When applying the law with impartiality, some judges argue that justice
is and should be blind.47 The corollary of this argument is that truly blind
justice is justice free from judicial personal bias or worldview. Pushing
the envelope, many judges (and legal scholars) maintain that the law
should be colorblind even when attempting to remedy racial
discrimination.48
To the contrary, legal realists believe that a judge's personal biases in-
fluence her interpretation of the law.4 9 Of course, judges are people and,
naturally, can fall victim to their biases5o and to their unconscious
45. "Post-supercapitalism" refers hereinafter to the socio-political-economic order in
America represented by the current recession following the credit crisis and the govern-
ment bailout of Wall Street, the auto industry, and AIG. See Crusto, Obama's Moral Capi-
talism, supra note 34, at 1011-13 (exploring empathy's relationship to moral capitalism in
the context of predatory lending). See generally ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINEss, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3-5 (2007) (ar-
guing that people's power has shifted from democratic power to consumerism-driven
power); Lou DOBBS, WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 2-3 (2006) (arguing that big businesses
and big governments are undermining the middle class).
46. See JACOB S. HACKER ET AL., ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, ECONOMIC SECURITY
AT RISK: FINDINGS FROM THE ECONOMIC SECURITY INDEX, at ii, 8 (2010), available at
http://www.economicsecurityindex.org/upload/media/Eco-
nomic Security_1ndex FullReport.pdf (reporting that one in five Americans has exper-
ienced a decline of 25 percent or more in available household income, a plunge that will
require six to eight years just to climb back to previous levels of income). See generally
JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SIFr: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES,
HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT (2006).
47. See, e.g., Molly Townes O'Brien, Essay, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet:
The Plessy Disaster's Color-Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 753, 753
(1998).
48. See id. (addressing the limitations of constitutional color-blindness in judicial deci-
sions by analyzing the relationship that federalism has with color-blind racial justice; Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306-07 (2003) (upholding a public law school's use of race in
admissions decisions to maintain a diverse student body by using "diversity" as a non-race-
based judicial criterion). See generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities":
Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 985-92 (2007) (dis-
cussing the history of color-blindness in the context of anti-discrimination law).
49. See generally FRANK, supra note 3.
50. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2009)
("[E]mpirical analysis suggests that African American judges as a group and White judges
as a group perceive racial harassment differently. These findings counter the traditional
myth that the race of a judge would not make a difference-a myth premised on a pre-
sumption of a formalistic and objective decision making process.").
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minds.51 Therefore, despite the belief that judges blindly rule exclusively
based on the law and facts, judge's should also become self-aware of how
their personal biases impact their decisions. For example, in A Time to
Kill, the judge's racial bias blinded him from seeing a father's anguish
over the law's failure to redress his young daughter's brutal rape and near
death. Accordingly, judges should realize that blind justice may result in
injustice.
Through the lens of critical discourse and recent theories of uncon-
scious adverse behavior, this Article argues that a judge needs to face her
inner-self. If sincere in her pursuit of true justice, a judge must actively
seek means to identify, understand, and mitigate her own personal biases,
including unconscious ones. Judicial history offers many examples of how
courageous judges overcame their personal biases by applying value prin-
ciples. 52 A notable example is Judge John Minor Wisdom, a southern
aristocrat, who wrote unpopular desegregation decisions following Brown
v. Board of Education, putting himself and his family at great personal
risk.53 He and others put status and biases aside and made historic, brave
decisions that positively changed the lives of millions of Afircn Ameri-
cans and others. Such empathic judging requires conscientious self-re-
flection and courage.
There is a reason why some judges fail to address their biases. Most
judges are unaware of a judicial temperament disorder this Article will
refer to as "empathy deficient myopia," 54 the result of unconscious judi-
51. See, e.g., Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV.
509, 512 (2008) (analyzing a Yale empirical study to explain "'white male effect'-a 'well
documented pattern' showing that certain white men fear various risks less than women
and minorities"); Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explain-
ing the White Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 465 (2007);
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2005) ("Recent social
cognition research has provided stunning evidence of implicit bias against various social
categories. In particular, it reveals that most of us have implicit biases against racial minor-
ities notwithstanding sincere self-reports to the contrary.").
52. See, e.g., JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 13-14 (1981), FRANK T. READ & Lucy S.
McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH, at
xi-xii (1978) (describing how four Fifth Circuit, Republican judges integrated the South).
Cf MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN His-
TORY, at xvi, 7, 8 (2007) (concluding, inter alia, that the Supreme Court has been a foe to
African Americans and other racial minorities); Michael Hiltzik, "Empathy" on 1927 Su-
preme Court Might Have Saved Thousands from the Knife, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/04/business/fi-hiltzik4 (arguing that Oliver Wendell Holmes
and the Court were wrong in their Buck v. Bell decision, upholding the forced sterilization
of "mental defectives," stating that "its consequence was tens of thousands of ruined lives
over the next half-century"); Dahlia Lithwick, Stevens's Real Legacy: Why the E Word
Matters, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/08/stevens-s-real-leg-
acy.html (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in
high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent.")).
53. See BASS, supra note 52, at 16-17, 50-51. This Article's Author clerked for Judge
John Minor Wisdom.
54. "Empathy deficit myopia" refers hereinafter to a judge's conscious or unconscious
decision to ignore or discount the law's impact on the lives of everyday people.
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cial classism 55 and judicial groupthink.56
1. Unconscious Judicial Classism
Unconscious judicial classism continues the work of critical race the-
ory57 and critical feminist theory58 and is consistent with these theories.
Essentially, legal discourses on race and gender have not reached their
full potential because they have not accounted for the role of class,59
55. Unconscious judicial classism refers hereinafter to the unconscious judicial tem-
perament towards class bias based on privileged status.
56. Judicial groupthink refers hereinafter to the conscious or unconscious judicial phe-
nomenon in which a judge promotes and defends the status quo, resulting in part from the
reinforcement of her shared worldview in a group dynamic. See generally DAVID
BUCHANAN & ANDRZEJ HUCZYNSKI, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: AN INTRODUCTORY
TEXT 283 (3d ed. 1997) (stating that according to Irving Janis, groupthink is defined as "a
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-
group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to appraise
realistically the alternative courses of action"); IRVING L. JANUS, VICTIMS OF
GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES
2-5, 8-9 (1972).
57. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado
ed., Temple Univ. Press 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., New Press 1995); Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race
Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1999) (arguing that anti-racist
scholars generally misunderstand the relationship between racial and other forms of op-
pression, and thus help perpetuate heterosexism); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive
Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455,
1469 (2002) (criticizing the "progressive race blindness" theory for failing to embrace race
as an important dimension of identity); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and
Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENv. U. L. REV.
329, 330-33 (2006) (suggesting that the critical race theory should more adequately account
for issues of class); Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial
Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 723, 724-27 (2006)
(discussing the problem of unconscious racism in felon disenfranchisement).
58. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Does Nothing Ever Change; Is Everything New?: Comments
on the "To Do Feminist Legal Theory" Symposium, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN's L.J. 415,415-16
(2003) (summarizing various works of critical feminist theory scholarship); Don S. Brown-
ing, Linda McClain's The Place of Families and Contemporary Family Law: A Critique
from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1403-04 (2007) (proposing a theory of "criti-
cal familism" to challenge trends in family law theory); Verna L. Williams, Private Choices,
Public Consequences: Public Education Reform and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563, 563-68 (2006) (discussing public education from a critical femi-
nist theory perspective).
59. See, e.g., JORDAN & HARRIS, supra note 20, at 420-600; MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET
AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAw 1-6 (2003); Clark Fresh-
man, Foreword: Revisioning the Constellations of Critical Race Theory, Law and Econom-
ics, and Empirical Scholarship, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2267, 2269-71 (2003) (suggesting an
overlap between critical race theory and empirical studies of inequality); Melissa Hart,
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 741-45
(2005) (discussing discrimination in employment decisions); Kristin Brandser Kalsem,
Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women: How Intersectionality Matters
in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1181, 1181-90 (2006) (arguing that feminist legal
theory requires broader thinking about matters relating to women's financial well-being);
Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact
Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1480-85 (1996) (discuss-
ing disparate impact and class theory in the employment context); Rachel Bloomekatz,
Comment, Rethinking Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-
Wage Workplace, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1963, 1964-68 (2007) (analyzing the statutory reme-
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which makes it compelling to explore unconscious judicial classism.
Unconscious judicial classism is different from past critical discourse.
It posits that judges have an unconscious bias to maintain the status quo,
consistent with arguments that racial bias results from subjective deci-
sions.60 Further, it contends that judges unconsciously favor the powerful
over the powerless, thereby supporting institutional classism.61 There-
fore, unconscious judicial classism is a valuable analytical tool in assessing
how classism influences judicial decision making. In addition to overcom-
ing unconscious biases, judges fall victim to groupthink.
2. Judicial Groupthink and Decision Making
Judicial groupthink has observable symptoms; 6 2 essentially, it argues
that groups that are alike think alike.63 Groupthink analysis helps to ex-
plain Supreme Court decision making. At first glance, the Court's socio-
logical diversity64 Suggests styles in diverse decision making. Yet, beyond
its apparent diversity, the Court's membership is very homogeneous. The
current Justices share the following background: Ivy-League law school
training,65 wealth, privileged upbringing, 66 middle-aged or elderly hetero-
dies available for U.S. workers to challenge employment discrimination in favor of
immigrants).
60. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 59, at 744-45 (explaining that in some contexts discrimi-
nation may be the result of individuals making subjective decisions).
61. Institutional classism refers hereinafter to the study of institutional classism, the
phenomenon by which financial institutions, such as banks, mortgage lenders, credit-card
companies, payday loan companies, student-loan lenders, car-loan companies, and the like,
consciously or unconsciously, take advantage of prey." See Crusto, Obama's Moral Capi-
talism, supra note 34, at 1019. See generally JAMES K. GILBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE:
How CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD
Too (2008) (attempting to purge the liberal mind of the false economic idols of monetary
control, balanced budgets, and decreased governmental regulations).
62. IRVING L. JANUS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES 174-75 (2d ed. 1983) (devising symptoms of groupthink: (1) "An illusion of
invulnerability ... which creates excessive optimism" and encourages risk taking; (2) ratio-
nalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions; (3) "unquestioned belief in
the group's inherent morality, . . . [causing] members to ignore the . . . consequences of
their" actions; (4) stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased,
spiteful, disfigured, impotent, or stupid; (5) "direct pressure" to conform placed on any
member who questions the group, couched in terms of disloyalty; (6) "self-censorship" of
ideas that deviate from the "apparent group consensus;" (7) "illusion[s] of unanimity"
among group members, where silence is viewed as agreement; and (8) "self-appointed
mindguards-members who protect the group from adverse information").
63. See, e.g., Katz & Stafford, supra note 32, at 457-64; Secunda, supra note 18, at
107-08.
64. See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Does the U.S. Supreme Court Need Another Protes-
tant?, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/Religion/post/
2010/04/supreme-court-justice-stevens-catholic-jewish/1 (noting one African-American
man (Thomas), one Hispanic woman (Sotomayer), two Jewish women (Ginsberg and Ka-
gan), one Jewish man (Breyer), and four white men (Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, and
Scalia)).
65. See Tim Padgett, Is the Supreme Court Too Packed With Ivy Leaguers?, TIME,
May 12, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1988877,00.html.
66. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1713-14 (1993) (arguing that society has historically treated "whiteness" as an object of
intrinsic value protected by social and legal institutions). Cf Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness
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sexuality, physical capacity, and Christian or Jewish faith. 6 7 Moreover,
each enjoys the same current socio-economic status: a high paying job,
great benefits, guaranteed job security, a sizable pension, and a title of
nobility.68 One wonders whether judges with such shared and limited ex-
periences are equipped to appreciate what it means to be different from
others. Predictably, they are emotionally unconnected from many liti-
gants who appear before them, making it hard to appreciate their deci-
sions from the perspectives of diverse litigants.69
This issue is most telling when religion plays a role in decision making,
as the majority of the Court is Roman Catholic. 70 Should a Justice's relig-
ion disqualify her from hearing upcoming Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause cases?71 Particularly, should a Catholic Justice recuse
herself in cases involving issues like abortion? 72 Would the pressures of
excommunication from the Catholic Faith influence her decision?73 Evi-
dence shows that a judge's religion is a proven basis for judicial bias in
religious cases.74 Still, courts hold that a judge's religion does not dis-
as Property: Sex, Race, Status, and Wealth, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 51, 168-69 (2005) (argu-
ing that the history of society's treatment of "blackness" as private and state property
provides a case for reparations and affirmative action).
67. See Grossman, supra note 64; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 R.
3.6, cmt. 4 (2010) ("A judge's membership in a religious organization [is] a lawful exercise
of freedom of religion" and does not violate the Judicial Conduct Rule, generally prohibit-
ing membership in discriminatory organizations.).
68. See generally U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by
the United States.") Similarly, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 bars the states, rather than
the federal government, from granting titles of nobility. Id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
69. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) ("It is plain from the face of
the state court's opinion that it failed to apply the correct prejudice inquiry we have estab-
lished for evaluating Sears's Sixth Amendment claim. We therefore grant the petition for
writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings").
70. See Lisa Desjardins, Sotomayor Would Be a Part of Court's Catholic Shift, CNN,
May 27, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/27/sotomayor.catholic/ (stating
that as Sonia Sotomayor "breaks ground for Hispanics, she is poised to add an exclamation
point to another historic demographic shift: the move to a Catholic court . . .. Of the 110
people . . . 11 have been Catholic. Five of those justices-Samuel Alito, Anthony Ken-
nedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice John Roberts-are currently on
the court").
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no laws representing an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."). See generally REDLICH,
supra note 11, at 690 ("Two competing approaches to interpretation of the religion clauses
... the wall of separation between church and state, and the accommodation of religion-
continue to dominate the Court's decisions today").
72. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (identifying a woman's right to
privacy in abortion matters).
73. Ian Fisher & Larry Roher, Pope Opens Trip with Remarks Against Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES.COM, May 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/americas/l0pope.html
(reporting that Pope Benedict XVI said that "'Legislative action in favor of abortion is
incompatible with participation in the Eucharist,' . . . and politicians who vote that way
should 'exclude themselves from communion.' . . . [Clertain values, including protecting
human life from conception to natural death, [are] 'not negotiable' and .. . Catholic politi-
cians [have] a 'grave responsibility' to promote such laws.").
74. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Em-
pirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 491, 491-503 (2004) (on the
influence of religion on judicial decision making).
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qualify her from hearing those cases.75 Similarly, a judge should not re-
cuse herself merely because it appears that she is an advocate for a group
that is appearing before her.7 6 But a judge has an ethical and legal obli-
gation to self-recuse when she believes that a bias would influence a
decision.
Therefore, judges should become aware of how empathy deficit myo-
pia, a combination of judicial institutional classism and groupthink, af-
fects the quality of their decision making. Currently, judges fail to do so,
as evidenced by certain recent Supreme Court decisions. They show the
triumph of formalism over value principles and reveal a need for change.
B. INJUSTICE
Recent Supreme Court decisions show how some judges often apply
the law while apparently failing to consider the effects on people's every-
day lives, especially of those less fortunate than themselves. These cases
illustrate how judges elevate formalism over value principles. In Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,77 the Court employed neutral
First Amendment principles to allow large, powerful institutions, includ-
ing corporations and unions, to greatly influence national and local elec-
tions, suppressing the voice and interests of average citizens.78 In Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board79 the court
75. See, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g. Co. v. AT&T Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1182-83 (D. Utah 2005) ("The Tenth Circuit emphatically held that 'merely because Judge
Stewart belongs to and contributes to the Mormon Church would never be enough to dis-
qualify him.' This is true regardless of which side in the litigation believes that the religious
affiliation of the judge makes him partial to one side or the other.").
76. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F.
Supp. 155, 162-63 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (denying a recusal motion against black judge who had
demonstrated an appearance of partiality towards the black plaintiffs).
77. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913-14 (2010) (holding that the government may not, under the
First Amendment, "suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate iden-
tity," overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (a federal
statute barring independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications vi-
olated the First Amendment), and overruling McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. 93 (2003) (the disclaimer and disclosure provisions of Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 did not violate the First Amendment, as applied to nonprofit corporation's film
and three advertisements for the film)).
78. See Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After
Citizens United, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 2365, 2390 (2010) ("In contrast to the Citizens
United majority, the American public supports limitations on free speech in the interest of
combating dangers posed by unchecked corporate election spending."); see also Robert L.
Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner's Error in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y 311, 316 (2010) ("Doing so quite
arguably also represents accepting an understanding of democracy and freedom of expres-
sion in which huge, powerful corporate institutions dominate the political marketplace of
ideas, their interests theoretically arrayed against each other, but with the role of most
citizens a diminished, passive one. The advancement of such an understanding . .. trends
away from a sovereignty of the many toward a sovereignty of the few.").
79. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3150-52, 3162-64 (2010) (holding that the provision of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, allowing aggrieved parties to challenge final order or rule of Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a court of appeals, did not strip the district court of
jurisdiction; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's dual for-cause limitations on removal of members of
the board contravened the Constitution's separation of powers; such limitations were sev-
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again used a formalistic analysis to allow large, sometimes unscrupulous,
financial institutions to exploit consumers8 o Similarly, in McDonald v.
City of Chicago,8' the Court applied a formalistic analytical method to
the Second Amendment, which resulted in greater gun availability in ur-
ban centers, resulting in more homicides. 82 Finally, in Safford Unified
School District No. 1 v. Redding,83 the Court yet again exercised a formal-
istic approach to deny constitutional privacy protection to a 13-year-old
girl in a public school setting, 84 against one seasoned Justice's heated
objection. 5
These cases illustrate how a judge's reliance on formalism adversely
impacts justice. They raise the volume in the debate on judicial tempera-
ment and evidence the crisis facing today's constitutional law and the
need for change.
C. THE EMPATHY STANDARD
Concurrent with these Supreme court decisions, the debate on judicial
decision making has centered on the role of empathy.86 Relative to the
erable; and appointment of members of the board by the SEC did not violate the Appoint-
ments Clause).
80. Minh Van Ngo, A Corporate Practitioner's Perspective on Recent Supreme Court
Cases, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 43, 51-54 (2010) (analyzing Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Board and concluding, "One common thread in these decisions
is the majority's emphasis of form over substance and principles of interpretation over
policy considerations.").
81. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the Second Amendment right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-
defense and that the protection of this right may be applied to both the federal government
as well as the states).
82. See Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amend-
ment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 (2010) ("With the Supreme Court and states enlarging the scope
of Second Amendment rights and an ever-expanding gun culture in the United States, it is
quite possible that the use of firearms by private individuals will significantly increase. In
fact, the coming decades may demonstrate an ongoing shift of criminal enforcement from
police forces to armed citizens. Already, private citizens shoot and kill more than 2.5 times
as many criminals as members of the police do."); Geoffrey Schotter, Diachronic Constitu-
tionalism: A Remedy for the Court's Originalist Fixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241,
1347 (2010) (criticizing the Court's originalist approach in cases like McDonald: "At best,
one can say that some judges try harder to obey the Constitution than others, but those
judges who interpret the Constitution synchronically by falsely separating 'the past' from
'the present' are cutting corners.").
83. 557 U.S. 364, 374-79 (2009) (holding that a principal's reasonable suspicion that a
student was carrying contraband did not justify a strip search, but that law regarding strip
searches of students was not clearly established, and therefore the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity).
84. See Justin R. Chapa, Stripped of Meaning: The Supreme Court and the Government
As Educator, 2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 127, 131 (2011) ("The end result suggests that the
school administrators who strip-searched Savana Redding did so less out of a flawed un-
derstanding of legal doctrine than a failure to question an institutional culture-fostered in
part by the Court's explication of the Government as Educator-that increasingly pro-
motes the idea that 'Real Schools' combat social problems.").
85. Redding, 557 U.S. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) ("[I]t does not require a
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of
constitutional rights of some magnitude.").
86. See, e.g., Peter Slevin, Obama Makes Empathy a Requirement for Court, WASH.
PosT, May 13, 2009, at A3. See also Jim Newton, Earl Warren, a Justice with Empathy,
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concept of blind justice, some argue that empathy is essential to achieve
real justice,87 is a means to attain it,88 or is contrary to it.89 As empathy
in judicial decision making has devolved from President Barack Obama's
empathy standard in judicial selection, a brief review of Obama's vision
of empathy is appropriate. While first introduced in moral, personal
terms, 90 Obama used the word "empathy" to critique the judicial style of
Supreme Court nominee John Roberts. 91 Obama noted that Roberts
qualified as a traditional Supreme Court justice92 but further stated that a
judge's empathy was critical in deciding the most difficult cases. 93 As
President, Obama enrolled empathy as a judicial appointment standard
when Justice David Souter resigned,94 and then again when he nominated
L.A. TIMES.COM, May 24, 2009, http://articles.1atimes.com/2009/may/24/opinion/oe-
newton24 ("Jim Newton is the editor of The Times' editorial page and is the author of
'Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made."'); Damon W. Root, Judicial Em-
pathy and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, REASON.COM (June 3, 2009), http://reason.com/
blog/2009/06/03/judicial-empathy-and-justicee-o (last visited July 25, 2012) ("Over at Lib-
erty & Power, historian Paul Moreno, author of the superb Black Americans and Organ-
ized Labor, has a long and fascinating post looking at the problems with several previous
empathy-driven Supreme Court nominations. As Moreno notes, President Theodore
Roosevelt told his friend and ally Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge that it was 'eminently desirable
that our Supreme Court should show in unmistakable fashion their entire sympathy with
all proper effort to secure the most favorable possible consideration for the men who most
need that consideration."'). Cf Floyd Brown & Mary Beth Brown, Blind Lady Justice?,
THE CABIN.NET (May 16, 2009), http://thecabin.net/stories/051609/opi0516090018.shtml
(citing writer Thomas Sowell contrasting the empathy Obama seeks in his judicial appoin-
tees with the "rule of law" which he argues is critical to this country: "[I]f someone was a
member of groups of X, Y, or Z and they were to appear before a judge with empathy for
groups A, B, and C, that would go against the idea of the 'rule of law."').
87. Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOzo L.
REV. DE NOVO 133, 135-38 (2009).
88. Id. at 133-34.
89. Epstein, supra note 5 ("In looking at a dispute between an injurer and an injured
party, or between a creditor and debtor, the judge ignores personal features of the litigant
that bear no relationship to the merits of the case.").
90. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 66-69 (2006) [hereinafter OBAMA, AUDACITY] (defining empathy as
"a call to stand in someone else's shoes and see through their eyes"). See also WILLIAM
SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 139 (2008) (discussing how the Republican
Party used "compassion" to appeal to the average, working voter). Cf DOUGLAS WEAD,
THE COMPASSIONATE TOUCH (1977). "In 1979, Wead's 'The Compassionate Conservative'
speech at an annual Washington Charity Dinner reportedly inspired President George W.
Bush to adopt the phrase ["compassionate conservatism"] JACOB WEISBERG, THE BUSH
TRAGEDY 92-93 (2008)."
91. See Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the Confirmation Hearing of Judge John
Roberts (Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://obamaspeeches.com/031-Confirmation-of-
Judge-John-Roberts-Obama-Speech.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) ("Adherence to legal
precedent and rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent of
the cases that come before [the Court], so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at
the same place most of the time").
92. Id.
93. Id. ("What matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly
difficult . .. [and] can only be determined on the basis of one's deepest values, one's core
concerns, one's broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth
of one's empathy . . . the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge's heart").
94. Remarks by the President on Justice David Souter, WHITE HOUSE (May 1, 2009),
http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Justice-David-Souter
("It is also about how our laws affect the daily realities of people's lives-whether they can
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Judge Sonia Sotomayor as Souter's replacement. 95 Later, upon Justice
John Paul Stevens's retirement 96 and following in his nomination of Solic-
itor General Elena Kagan as Stevens's replacement, Obama elaborated
that under the empathy standard a judge's personal experiences should
show a commitment to justice, an appreciation of the law's impact on
people's lives, and protection of the powerless against the interests of the
powerful. 97 President Obama's empathy standard has ignited a broader
debate on judicial temperament and its impact on the quality of justice.
Clearly, a change in constitutional direction is needed and requires an
examination of judicial temperament. Consequently, judges should seek
tools to explore their biases, including a decision making tool illustrated
in biblical history. As judges may not voluntarily address their inner de-
mons, the judicial selection process and rules of civil procedure should be
reviewed and modified as needed to effect a change in judicial decision
making.
III. EMPATHIC DIALOGUE
So the LORD said: the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah is so
great, and their sin so grave, that I must go down and see whether or
not their actions are as bad as the cry against them that comes to me.
I mean to find out.
As the men turned and walked on toward Sodom, Abraham re-
mained standing before the LORD. Then Abraham drew near and
said: "Will you really sweep away the righteous with the wicked?
Suppose there were fifty righteous people in the city; would you re-
ally sweep away and not spare the place for the sake of the fifty
righteous people within it? Far be it from you to do such a thing, to
kill the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous and the
wicked are treated alike! Far be it from you! Should not the judge
of all the world do what is just?" The LORD replied: If I find fifty
righteous people in the city of Sodom, I will spare the whole place
for their sake.98
make a living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in their homes and wel-
come in their own nation.").
95. Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United
States Supreme Court, WHITE HoUSE (May 26, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-nominating-judge-sonia-sotomayor-united-states-supreme-
court.
96. Remarks by the President on the Retirement of Justice Stevens and on the West
Virginia Mining Tragedy, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-retirement-justice-stevens-and-west-virginia-mining-trag-
edy (remarking that a Justice should have "a keen understanding of how the law affects the
daily lives of the American people").
97. Remarks by the President and Solicitor General Elena Kagan at the Nomination of
Solicitor General Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court, WHITE HoUSE (May 10, 2010), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-solicitor-general-elena-ka-
gan-nomination-solicitor-general-el.
98. Genesis 18:20-33 (New American). See generally Robert A. Burt, Constitutional
Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984) (analyzing the use of para-
bles to facilitate constitutional law development). Cf Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidel-
ity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (promoting a natural
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In seeking a solution to biased, insensitivity and blind injustice, I posit
that the judiciary employ empathic dialogue facilitates a judge's moral,
legal, and ethical duty to seek just results in the application of the law.
A. JUSTICE
In the biblical passage above, Abraham's dialogue with God shows the
goal of empathic dialogue to achieve just results in judicial decision mak-
ing. There, God plans to destroy all the city's inhabitants, including the
good, in order to punish sin.99 In a classic empathic dialogue with God,
Abraham inquires whether it would be just to treat the innocent and
guilty alike.' 00 God decides that for fifty innocent people he would not
destroy the cities. 01
This biblical example of empathic dialogue teaches three lessons rela-
tive to judicial decision making: First, a judge has a moral obligation to
inquire into the nature of justice by challenging status-quo authoritarian-
ism, as Abraham challenged God's absolute authority and blind sense of
justice. 102 Second, a judge needs to reach beyond her own perspectives
and experiences in order to see rulings from the eyes of others, as Abra-
ham asked God to see justice from the eyes of the city's innocents.10 3
Third, a judge should aspire to identify and apply value principles of jus-
tice, as God agreed that it would be unjust to kill innocent people for the
sake of punishing the guilty.104 These valuable lessons highlight a judge's
moral duty to seek just results in her application of the law.
Applied to contemporary constitutional law, a judge should employ
empathic dialogue to assess difficult issues such as the constitutionality of
the death penalty. For example, a judge has a moral obligation to hold
the death penalty unconstitutional because there are many innocent peo-
ple on death row.105 Utilizing empathic dialogue to assess this controver-
sial issue would result in identifying and applying a value principle: it is
law philosophy in which morality is the source of law's binding power; H.L.A. Hart, Posi-
tivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (promoting a
positivist approach to law as separate from ethics or morals). See generally Joseph William
Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 1 (2005); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD (2000) (noting
the true sins of Sodom and Gomorrah were "a failure of hospitality to strangers and a lack
of concern for the poor"). The author kindly acknowledges Professor Joseph William
Singer for planting the seed of this analysis during the Inaugural Symposium for Stanford's
Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.






105. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 154 (1990) (showing that defendants were 4.3 times as
likely to receive the death penalty when the victim was white rather than black). See gener-
ally STEPHEN KING, THE GREEN MILE (1996) (showing the injustice of corporal punish-




unjust for the state to wrongly execute innocent persons in an attempt to
rightly execute guilty persons. 106 In this situation, empathic dialogue
serves a moral purpose: to apply the law in a way that protects the inno-
cent from overreaching formalism.
B. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
As reflected in the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, empathic
dialogue guides a judge's decision making to achieve just results. Simply
stated, empathic dialogue provides judges with an established discipline
to explore unconscious biases to achieve value principles. Using em-
pathic dialogue, a judge (1) consciously makes inquiry beyond her profes-
sional, intellectual, and personal worldviews; (2) confronts her
unconscious biases; (3) assesses the law's impact on the lives of everyday
people; (4) protects people from unfair outcomes and injustices; and (5)
redresses injustices that result from majoritarian abuses. Broadly ap-
plied, empathic dialogue differs from Obama's empathy standard in that
it is not limited to judicial appointments or to difficult cases, but is a judi-
cial decision making tool to achieve true justice.
C. JUDICIAL EXERCISE
How would a judge who is seeking to achieve value principles use em-
pathic dialogue? Empathic dialogue is founded on the principles and
practice of Socratic dialogue, a well-established, legal approach to discov-
ering the truth.107 In consulting empathic dialogue a judge can use exter-
nal dialogue with her judicial clerks, encourage oral argument with
litigants' legal counsel, or both. Alternatively, a judge could use internal
dialogue, that is, personal reflections of her biases to reach just results.
Furthermore, a judge could compare her rulings against already estab-
lished value principles to achieve just results. For example, how do the
judge's rulings compare to the value principle that innocent people
should not suffer in order to punish the guilty?
106. See Barbara J. Hayler, Moratorium and Reform: Illinois's Efforts to Make the
Death Penalty Process "Fair, Just, and Accurate", 29 JUST. Sys. J. 423, 424 (2008) (citing
People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 847-48 (Ill. 1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting) ("Despite the
courts' efforts to fashion a death penalty scheme that is just, fair, and reliable, the system is
not working. . . . The result, inevitably, will be that innocent persons are going to be
sentenced to death and be executed in Illinois. A sentencing scheme which permits such
horrific and irrevocable results cannot meet the requirements of . . . the United States
Constitution . . . or . . . the Illinois Constitution ..... )).
107. Socratic dialogue modified into the Socratic method, has been traditionally used in
law school classroom case analysis, although it is seldom used in its purest form today. See
generally Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV.
113, 113 (1999) ("The Socratic method has long been considered a defining element of
American legal education. Among both lawyers and laypersons, Socratic questioning is
perceived as a rite of passage that all law students endure in their first year of law
school."). Cf WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2163 (2002) (defining "So-
cratic method" as "the method of inquiry and instruction employed by Socrates esp. as
represented in the dialogues of Plato and consisting of a series of questionings the object of
which is to elicit a clear and consistent expression of something supposed to be implicitly
known by all rational beings").
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Empathic dialogue encourages a judge to apply the rule of law with
minimal negative impacts on innocent people. It does not require a judge
to actively ignore the law and legislate from the bench. A literary exam-
ple shows that just results can follow while still applying the exact lan-
guage of a contract:' 08 When the claimant Shylock demanded the
contractually guaranteed "pound of flesh" in Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice, the judge used the contract's specific words to pro-
duce a just result. 109 Hence, the court concluded that justice be served
but only to the extent that Shylock not spill a drop of Antonio's blood.
This analytical process does not mean that a judge should decide cases
strictly to favor the powerless, minorities, or individuals. In fact, it may
result in harsh enforcement of the law; in the biblical story, the guilty
sinners were severely punished. 110
The following arguments show the efficacy of empathic dialogue as a
judicial decision making means to achieve value principles. Also, consid-
ering the seriousness with which federal judges take their judicial obliga-
tions, empathic dialogue should be a voluntary tool which renders
mandatory requirements unnecessary. Yet there may be progressive
ideas, as that the Supreme Court's deliberations must be televised,11' that
might promote the institutionalization of empathic dialogue principles.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR EMPATHIC DIALOGUE
Public policy supports empathic dialogue as a valuable judicial decision
making discipline, as it reflects existing fundamental constitutional law
principles, addresses unconscious judicial bias, and leads to value
principles.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Empathy is a fundamental constitutional principle, and empathic dia-
logue is an established discipline in constitutional judicial review.112 Em-
108. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1 (Portia, imper-
sonating an eminent judge, states that: "The quality of mercy is not strain'd, It droppeth as
the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest: It blesseth him that
gives and him that takes.").
109. Id. act 4, sc. 1 ("Tarry a little, there is something else. This bond doth give thee
here no jot of blood; The words expressly are 'a pound of flesh.'").
110. See Genesis 18:20-33 (New American).
111. See Brandon Smith, The Least Televised Branch: A Separation of Powers Analysis
of Legislation to Televise the Supreme Court, 97 GEo. L.J. 1409, 1428 (2009) ("Both history
and the Justices themselves make clear that oral argument can and does affect judicial
decisionmaking.").
112. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE Su-
PREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICs 24 (1962) (analyzing the Court's ability to articu-
late "certain enduring values"); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND TH-E COURT:
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 52 (1960) (analyzing the Court's role in legitimating
governmental conduct); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JU-
DICIAL REVIEw (1980) (analyzing the Court's role in reinforcing fair democratic represen-
tation); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 (2001)
(analyzing the Court's role as a "representative institution well-shaped to speak on behalf
of the people about questions of moral and political principle"); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
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pathy, like federalism, is not expressly stated in the Constitution. Yet,
like federalism, its significance is grounded in the Constitution. Though
what follows is not an exhaustive analysis, it demonstrates that empathy
is a part of the foundation of constitutional law.
1. Trial by Jury
Perhaps the best illustration of the Founding Fathers' commitment to
empathy as a constitutional principle is the right to a jury trial,113 found in
Article III, Section 2.114 Specifically, a criminal defendant's right to trial
by a jury in the place where the alleged crime was perpetrated proves the
Founders' commitment to empathy, as evidenced by its prominent place-
ment in the third article of the Constitution. This fundamental right en-
sures that fellow citizens from the same locality judge both accused
persons and the victims of crimes, rather than a superior, such as an ap-
pointed judge from another locality. The right to a jury of persons most
empathetic towards the accused and the victims proves a constitutional
commitment to empathy.
The Founders repeated their commitment to empathy in the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury.115 Here again, this right is a promi-
nent requirement because it appears in the Bill of Rights. As an em-
pathic principle, the Bill of Rights ensures certain protections of
individual rights including a speedy trial, a public trial, a trial by an im-
partial jury, a trial in the locality where the alleged crime occurred, the
right of the accused to confront one's accuser and witnesses, the right to
present witnesses in the accused person's favor, and most importantly,
the right to have the assistance of legal counsel.116 These personal pro-
tections reflect the value principle that an accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, ensuring empathic treatment for the accused and rec-
ognizing her rights to liberty.
While the Sixth Amendment guarantees a citizen's right to a trial by
jury in criminal matters, it is the Seventh Amendment that ensures the
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 10 (2001) (analyzing the Court's independent judgment
as "likely, over time, to lead to better specification and implementation of constitutional
values than would an alternative regime"); ANDRAS SAJO, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 4
(2011) (analyzing how "emotions, through complicated mechanisms, do have an actual im-
pact on constitutional design and law").
113. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed.
2005); REDLICH, supra note 11, at 160-66.
114. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.").
115. U.S. CONST. amend. Vt ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,




right to a trial by jury in civil matters, yet again reinforcing the empathy
principle."17 Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment ensures and ex-
pressly extends the protections of a speedy and public trial and of an
impartial trial against the states,118 demonstrating that its drafters re-
adopted the Founders' commitment to empathy.
2. Other Examples of Empathic Constitutional Principles
In addition to rights guaranteed in a trial, the Constitution has several
other provisions that exemplify the empathy principle in certain criminal
matters. Showing empathy for American revolutionaries falsely accused
by the British as traitors, the Founders protected the rights of alleged
traitors from wrongful prosecution. 119 The Founders also showed empa-
thy for the accused by guaranteeing citizens the protections afforded by a
grand jury indictment1 20 and by establishing Fifth Amendment protec-
tions against double jeopardy; self-incrimination; deprivation of life, lib-
erty, and property without due process of law;121 and the right to "just
compensation" for governmental takings.122 Furthermore, the Founders
expressly granted the President the authority "to grant Reprieves and
Pardons" 123 to forgive criminal acts. Beyond the drafting of the Constitu-
tion, empathy continued to be a guiding constitutional principle in estab-
lishing exceptions to the stark enforcement of the criminal law, such as
the "self-defense" 1 2 4 plea, the "insanity defense,"1 25 the "innocent
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."); see also Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
504 (1959). Cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (upholding the principle an-
nounced in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1897) ("[A] State denies a black
defendant equal protection when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of
his race have been purposefully excluded . . . .") (Nevertheless, a defendant may not chal-
lenge the jury selection if the jury includes representatives of her race.)).
118. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
119. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3 ("No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
120. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .").
121. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law").
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation").
123. U.S CONsT. art. II, § 2 ("The President ... shall have Power to Grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
124. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
125. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (stating that
under the Durham rule a defendant is excused "if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect"); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substan-
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spouse" defense,126 the "mentally retarded" 127 defense rules, as well as
the mitigating factors in federal sentencing guidelines. 128 These examples
prove both that the Founders laid empathy as a constitutional corner-
stone and that subsequent federal judges continued to build on it. In ad-
dition to being a constitutional cornerstone, empathy can help address
new anti-bias constitutional standards.
B. JUDICIAL BIAS
The second argument for empathic dialogue is that federal judges can
adopt it to address bias. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,129 the
Supreme Court reassessed the self-recusal standards,130 wherein a judge's
campaign contributor was a party to a case before him.131 The Court
recognized that a judge's inquiry into actual bias is "often a private one,"
which "underscores the need for objective rules."132 The Court con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause133 provides
objective standards for self-recusal that do not require proof of actual
bias. 134
tive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 n.4 (1981) ("For example, we incorporate
facts about a defendant's personal history in raising the insanity defense.").
126. See, e.g., Reser v. Comm'r, 112 F.3d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the inno-
cent spouse defense, and explaining: "Congress ... has statutorily mitigated the harshness
of [the Tax Code] by enacting the innocent spouse defense. Accordingly, a taxpayer who
qualifies as an innocent spouse is relieved of liability for the tax, including interest, penal-
ties, and other amounts, attributable to a deficiency on the joint return."); United States v.
Lee, 232 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the government could not execute a
forfeiture judgment against the home owned by a convicted criminal husband and his inno-
cent wife, when owned as tenants by the entirety).
127. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 352
(2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals constituted "cruel and
unusual punishment" and that it was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). See generally
Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2565 (2003) (discussing the impact of the
Atkins decision on state criminal cases).
128. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2011).
129. 556 U.S. 868 (2009); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R.
2.11 (2007) ("A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently,
and diligently."); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2012) ("As used in this Code,
'impartiality' or 'impartial' denotes absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against,
particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in considering
issues that may come before the judge.").
130. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877 ("As new problems have emerged that were not dis-
cussed at common law, however, the Court has identified additional instances which, as an
objective matter, require recusal.").
131. Id. at 884 ("We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objec-
tive and reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case
had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising
funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or
imminent.").
132. Id. at 883-84 ("In defining these standards the Court has asked whether, 'under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,' the interest 'poses
such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guaran-
tee of due process is to be adequately implemented. ").
133. Id. at 889.
134. Id. at 881 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)) ("The Court asks not
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his
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The Caperton self-recusal, due-process standard may have broader ap-
plication following the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United.135
There, the Court held that the First Amendment protects large institu-
tions' political speech, invalidating a federal statute barring corporate ex-
penditures for electioneering communications.13 6 This decision increases
the types of judicial campaign contributions addressed directly by the
Court in the Caperton case. 137 Combining Caperton's heightened bias
standard with Citizens United's First Amendment protections, the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct needs revision, as it currently allows a
judge's campaign committee to solicit campaign contributions that are
"reasonable" in amount. 138
Some judicial ethicists criticize the U.S. Supreme Court for not adopt-
ing the judicial code of conduct that other federal judges must follow,
some proposing legislation requiring the Court to do so.1 3 9 They are mo-
tivated by (1) the fact that the Court lacks a judicial code; (2) the media
reports of judicial misbehavior; and (3) the Court's ruling in the Caperton
case.140 With the public's trust in the impartiality of judges at an all-time
position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 'potential for
bias."').
135. See id. at 883-85; Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876,
896-914 (2010).
136. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913-14.
137. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-85. In a case before the West Virginia Supreme Court,
the defendant's CEO, Don Blankenship, had donated $2.5 million to a political organiza-
tion that supported then Justice Brent Benjamin's election to the bench in addition to
another $500,000 in indirect expenditures for his campaign. Id. The Court stated that a
judge should recuse herself when:
there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable per-
ceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent.
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections:
Davis, White, and the Future ofJudicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENv. U. L. REV. 195, 197
n.10 (2008) (citing George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative
Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1560-61 (2008)
(showing that popular opinion polls in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the nation,
which show that between 75 percent and 95 percent of registered voters believe that cam-
paign contributors influence judges)); Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice:
Can They Live Together?, 52 ARIz. L. REV. 207, 213-17 (2010); Norman L. Greene, How
Great Is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court's Deci-
sions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial Elections, and Their
Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 897-98 (2010);
Adam Liptak, Caperton After Citizens United, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 205 (2010); Jonathan
H. Todt, Note, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: The Objective Standard for Judicial
Recusal, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 447-49 (2011); Senator Tom Udall, Amend the
Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner's Perspective on
Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 235, 238-43 (2010).
138. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 4, R. 4.4(B)(1). See generally LISA
G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 585 (2d
ed. 2008) (noting that there are thirty-eight states where judges are elected and where the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is followed).
139. See Mauro, supra note 4.
140. See generally Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872-90.
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low,14 1 several groups have proposed model reforms1 42 and a few states
have begun reexamining their recusal rules.143
These cases and scholarly criticisms of a judge's duty to address bias
show the importance of adopting empathic dialogue to improve judicial
temperament. As a point of comparison, the use of empathy in legisla-
tion has arguably produced just results, as discussed below.
C. VALUE PRINCIPLES
Lastly, empathic dialogue leads to just results, as seen in the legislative
response to the Supreme Court case of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. 1 4 4 In Ledbetter, the Supreme Court denied a woman's equal
pay claim for pay discrimination, due to the majority's interpretation of
the 180-day limit for filing a claim,145 placing a formalist, technical statute
of limitations over justice. In response to this controversial decision,
Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.146 In a cere-
monial signing, President Obama noted that empathy played a role in the
development of this legislation,147 making each unfair paycheck an act of
141. See Brandenburg, supra note 137 at 213-14 ("[A] 2009 Justice at Stake poll showed
that more than 80% of all voters support the idea of an impartial judge deciding recusal
requests and agree that judges should not hear cases involving their own major campaign
backers. Several groups have proposed model reforms. ... The American Bar Association
is exploring new model recusal rules, and a few states have been reexamining their recusal
rules.").
142. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING
RECUSAL STANDARDS 25-35 (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/re-
source/fair courtssettingrecusal standards/ (establishing a menu of ten ideas, including
empanelling outside judges to hear recusal motions against a particular judge, creating per
se rules for disqualification, and enhancing disclosure requirements for judges as well as
litigants); U.S.L. WR., DRAFT ABA REPORT REVIEws RULES AND PROCESSES FOR JUDI-
CIAL RECUSAL, RECOMMENDS IMPROVEMENTS 5 (June 16, 2009), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/damlaba/images/judicial-independence/lawweek-case-focus.pdf.
The American Bar Association is exploring new model recusal rules.
143. Tresa Baldas, Judges Slow To Toughen Up Recusal Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15,
2010.
144. 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2010)). Cf Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Gins-
burg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, was particularly critical of the major-
ity's narrow interpretation of the statute, although she didn't specifically use the word
empathy in her opinion. Id.; see Slevin, supra note 86 (discussing that during the 2008
presidential campaign, candidate Obama often criticized the Supreme Court's decision as
an example of a lack of empathy); Barack Obama, Discussion with Working Women (June
23, 2008), available at http://www.asksam.comlebooks/releases.asp?dochandle=1264117&
file=Obama-Speeches.ask&query=lillyledbetter&search=yes. During the presidential
campaign, then Senator Obama announced his co-sponsoring of a bill to redress violations
of equal pay legislation. See generally FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE PRESIDENTIAL DIFFER-
ENCE: LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM FDR To BARACK OBAMA (3rd ed. 2009) ("Even if he
wasn't African-American, he'd have a considerable entry in the history books.").
145. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628-29.
146. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat. at 5.
147. Macon Phillips, A Wonderful Day, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 29, 2009, 12:00 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blogpost/AWonderfulDay ("[J]ustice isn't about some abstract
legal theory, or footnote in a casebook. It's about how our laws affect the daily lives and




discrimination and thus reopening the 180-day window for filing a claim
and extending the statute of limitations. 148  Though controversial,
Obama's overall motivation for his first term's legislative agenda is his
sense of empathy. 149
In summary, empathic dialogue supports good public policy. It reflects
fundamental constitutional principles, addresses new Due Process stan-
dards for bias in judicial decision making, and seeks just results similar to
the goal of recent federal legislation.
V. OBJECTIONS TO EMPATHIC DIALOGUE
In response to arguments against it as a valuable judicial tool, empathic
dialogue constitutes valuable public policy.
A. JUST RESULTS
Some critics argue that empathic dialogue dictates that the poor and
the powerless must always win over the wealthy and the powerful, lead-
ing to socialism. 150 To the contrary, empathic dialogue seeks just results
in decisions, regardless of class or other distinctions. For example, a com-
parison of two cases involving the right to intrastate travel shows the uni-
versal benefits of empathic dialogue. In the first case, a federal judge
held that Hurricane Katrina evacuees lacked a right to travel from New
Orleans to an adjacent city because the Supreme Court has not expressly
held that there is a constitutional right to intrastate travel. 15 ' In contrast,
the Third Circuit, in Lutz v. City of York, 152 applied the substantive due
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011) and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2011));
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5411 (2011)); Credit Card Accountability, Re-
sponsibility and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L.
110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
150. See, e.g., John Amato, McCain Calls Obama a Socialist, but McCain Voted for the
Bail Out and Wants to Spend Government Money on the Mortgage Crisis, CROOKs & LIARS
(Oct. 19, 2008, 2:59 PM), http://crooksandliars.com/john-amato/mccain-calls-obama-social-
ist-mccain-vot ("MCCAIN: I think his plans are redistribution of the wealth. He said it
himself, 'We need to spread the wealth around.' . .. That's one of the tenets of socialism.");
Fred Barnes & Mort Kondracke, Is President Obama Taking Us Toward Socialism?, Fox
NEWS, (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,498909,00.html.
151. Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667, 2007 WL 1098787, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar.
30, 2007) ("While there is no doubt that a fundamental right of interstate travel exists, the
Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a right of intrastate travel exists. This Court
declines to find that there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel.") (emphasis added);
see also Mitchell F. Crusto, Enslaved Constitution: Obstructing Freedom to Travel, 70 U.
Prrrs. L. REV. 233, 233-34 (2008) [hereinafter Crusto, Enslaved Constitution] (arguing the
inherent constitutional right to intrastate travel as an expression of our Nation's liberty
paradigm over its enslavement paradigm, and analyzing the decision's enslavement
foundation).
152. 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
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process test153 to hold that the right to move freely is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in the Nation's his-
tory." 154 While the Dickerson court employed a formalistic approach to
reach an unjust result, the Lutz court reached a just decision through em-
pathic dialogue. This comparison proves that empathic dialogue seeks
universally beneficial decisions, such as ensuring the right to intrastate
travel, and does not seek wealth redistribution. Additionally, the Lutz
court's empathic approach to this question is consistent with a moral
reading of the Constitution. 155
Empathic dialogue also encourages a judge to increase the number of
winners and decrease the losers in their rulings. For example, the Su-
preme Court, in implementing its Brown v. Board of Education 56 deci-
sion, showed empathy to segregationists when it ordered the
desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed." 57 Similarly,
in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 58 while the Court recognized the U.S. Govern-
ment's title to all land within its boundaries, it also empathized with the
Native Americans by awarding them the right to occupy the land, rather
than holding them to be criminal trespassers. 59
Furthermore, empathic dialogue protects the wealthy from misconduct,
just as it applies to protect the poor. For example, a judge using empathic
dialogue should exact a severe penalty against investment advisor Bernie
Madoff for exploiting his wealthy investment clients in a weak federal
financial oversight environment.160 Empathic dialogue, therefore, is not
class legislation, but promotes utilization of shared values in order to
level the playing field in a majoritarian democracy.
153. Id. at 267-68 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he Due Process Clause substantively protects unenumerated rights 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' . . .
[Tihe relevant traditions must be identified and evaluated at the most specific level of
generality possible.").
154. Id.
155. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONsTITUTION 2 (1996) (noting that we interpret constitutional "clauses on the under-
standing that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice").
156. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
157. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (providing the
enforcement follow-up to Brown I).
158. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
159. Id. at 562; see also JOHN MARSHALL & JOHN E. OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND Eco-
NOMic DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL, 124-25 (1914) (recounting that in a letter to Jus-
tice Joseph Story, Justice Marshall went on to state his view that "every oppression now
exercised on a helpless people depending on our magnanimity and justice for the preserva-
tion of their existence impresses a deep stain on the American character").
160. See generally Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoffs $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme,
FORBES.COM (Dec. 12, 2008, 6:45 pm), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-
hedge-pf-ii-injrll 212croesus inl.html. Bernie Madoff was a financial advisor who alleg-




Some critics argue that federal judges will not place just results over
protection of the powerful, and therefore, that empathic dialogue is con-
trary to Derrick Bell's interest-convergence principle.161 To the contrary,
history shows that, through empathic dialogue, many judges have reached
beyond their personal biases to achieve just results.162 Consequently, a
judge should embrace empathic dialogue for the sake of her ensuring and
preserving a positive reputation in history. 163 The following cases illus-
trate how history applauds judges who have embraced empathic dialogue
to achieve just results. For example, in the landmark case of Loving v.
Virginia,164 the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation
law, protecting a mixed race couple's right to marry over states' interest
in maintaining racial segregation.' 65 Similarly, in Clay v. United States, 166
the Supreme Court decided that the appellant Ali had rightfully claimed
conscientious objector status against military service in the Vietnam
War,167 protecting the right to religious freedom over the Government's
interest in conducting war. Finally, in Meredith v. Fair,168 the U.S. Fifth
Circuit ordered the University of Mississippi to admit its first African-
American undergraduate, despite physical threats against the judges and
their families from radical segregationists. 1 6 9 In summary, through em-
161. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) ("Translated from judicial activity in racial
cases both before and after Brown, this principle of 'interest convergence' provides: The
interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges
with the interests of whites.").
162. See generally BASS, supra note 52 (describing how four Fifth Circuit, Republican
judges integrated the South and the resulting exposure to challenges to their personal
safety); Paul Butler, Will Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785
(2007) (identifying cases in which judges intentionally framed the law to achieve a just
outcome); Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1968) (reviewing
Richard Hildreth, Atrocious Judges: Lives of Judges, in FAMOUS As TOOLS OF TYRANTS
AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856) and describing formalism that judges have used
when applying fundamentally unjust laws).
163. The author is thankful to Professor Richard Delgado for highlighting a judge's
place in history as a motivator to change how the judge views cases, seeking to avoid being
labeled in history as moral monsters. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929,
1934 (1991) (presenting numerous examples of "notorious" cases and lessons on how to
avoid "serious moral error").
164. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
165. Id. at 12. Chief Justice Earl Warren, for a unanimous court, stated "Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State." Id.
166. 403 U.S. 698, 699-701 (1971) (Ali had filed an application with the United States
Selective Service System following a denial by the Louisville Local Board to recognize him
as a conscientious objector.).
167. Id. at 704-05.
168. 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962), recalled for more explicit judgment, 306 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962). See generally Crusto, New Federalism, supra
note 9; Mitchell F. Crusto, Federalism and Civil Rights: The Meredith Case, 11 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 233 (1989).
169. See BAsS, supra note 52.
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pathic dialogue, judges can reach just results, thereby preserving their
place in history, consistent with the interest-convergence principle.
C. JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
Some critics argue that empathic dialogue fails because judges will not
voluntarily adopt empathy for those who are different or less fortunate
than the judges themselves. Assuming the current composition of the Su-
preme Court, how does empathic dialogue compare to reform judicial
recusal rules? For example, it has been suggested that the federal judici-
ary add more sociological diversity, 170 but this alone does not ensure just
decisions since judges who are alike sociologically do not necessarily
think the same.171 Compared to current proposals, empathic dialogue
works best because it promotes the integrity of the federal judiciary. Rel-
ative to mandatory recusal proposals, 172 empathic dialogue does not en-
force morality, but rather encourages judges to become self-aware of how
their biases impact their decisions.
In summary, empathic dialogue is the best solution to the needed
change in judicial temperament. It promotes judicial self-inspection and
is more likely to promote value principles than sociological diversity.
Overall, empathic dialogue promotes federal judicial integrity and suc-
ceeds because it is voluntary.
VI. CONCLUSION: A SOLUTION TO BLIND INJUSTICE
You see in all this legal maneuvering, something's gotten lost. That
something is the truth. It is incumbent on us as lawyers not to just talk
about the truth, but to live it. My teacher taught me that. What is it in us
that seeks the truth? Is it our minds or is it our heart? I set out to prove
a black man can receive a fair trial in the South. That we are all equal in
the eyes of the law. That is not the truth. Cause the eyes of the law are
human eyes . . . yours and mine. And until we can see each other as
equals, justice is never going to be evenhanded. It will remain nothing
more than a reflection of our own prejudices. So until that day, we have a
duty under God to seek the truth. Not with our eyes, not with our minds,
170. See generally Ciara Torres-Spelliscy et al., Improving Judicial Diversity, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/96dl6b62f331bbl3ac kfm6bplue.pdf
(evaluating the impact of a lack of diversity on judicial decision making).
171. See generally MICHAEL G. LONG, MARSHALLING JUSTICE: THE EARLY CIVIL
RIGHTS LETTERS OF THURGOOD MARSHALL (2011) (documenting the courage of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund's key litigator in countless courtroom battles including the
Brown decision); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
(2000) (documenting the civil rights contributions of America's greatest civil rights advo-
cate and jurist). Cf SCOTr DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (2002); SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ORIGINAL SIN: CLARENCE THOMAS
AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVES (2002); Jagan Nicholas
Ranjan, The Politicization of Clarence Thomas, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2084, 2102 (2003); see
also Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483, 1510 (2007) (naming Justice Thomas as "to-
day's most extreme conservative" on the Supreme Court).
172. See Mauro, supra note 4.
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with fear and hate, with community of prejudice, but with our hearts.173
This Article concludes that empathic dialogue is a valuable judicial dia-
lectic towards value principles of constitutional law. As judges have
moral, legal, and ethical duties to find justice, they may find empathic
dialogue a valuable tool to explore their judicial subconscious, weed out
bias, and produce just results, especially relative to class. As illustrated in
the A Time to Kill excerpt, the quest for justice does not end with the
application of formalistic rules of law, but must grapple with a judge's
prejudices in order to achieve truth and justice.
173. A TIME TO KILL, supra note 1 (Jake Tyler Brigance's closing argument).
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